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RECENT DECISIONS
has never accepted the doctrine' 8 although many concluded that it
had done so in the Parnell case 19 and its adoption was advocated in
the Flaherty case.20
The trend is toward limiting the application of the doctrine of
attractive nuisance and this extends to the United States Supreme
Court which has led the jurisdictions following the doctrine.21 It is
submitted that the doctrine should be limited since its unlimited appli-
cation would impose a crushing burden of care on property owners.
However, the law has always recognized the need to protect minors
against their lack of discretion and judgment, both in contracts and in
crimes committed against them and involving their consent. It would
seem equally logical to afford a modicum of protection to children
trespassers where the danger and attractiveness of the instrumentality
is obvious to adults and the instrument is easily accessible to children
who may reach it despite the care of reasonably watchful parents, and
when the danger could, without undue hardship or inconvenience, be
eliminated by the owner.
L. D. B.
SUCCESSION TAXES-SITUS OF INTANGIBLES-DOUBLE TAXA-
TION (Two CAsES).-(First Case) Decedent, while a resident of
Colorado, created a trust of securities which she delivered to a Colo-
rado trustee, the settlor of the trust retaining the power of revocation.
After becoming a resident of New York, she died without exercising
liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a
structure or other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if
"(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to tres-
pass, and
"(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know
and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unusual risk of
death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
"(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the
area made dangerous by it, and
"(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as
compared to the risk to young children involved therein."
Paragraph (d) would appear to be a modification of the general rule of
the turntable cases. It would probably be difficult to say that a turntable, for
example, is of slight utility to a railroad company as compared with the risk it
creates to young children.
18 Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 280 N. Y. 110, 19 N. E. (2d) 981 (1939);
Walsh v. Fitchburg Ry., 1"45 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895).
19 Parnell v. Holland Furnace Co., 260 N. Y. 604, 184 N. E. 112 (1932).2 0 Flaherty v. Metro Stations, Inc., 202 App. Div. 583, 196 N. Y. Supp. 2
(4th Dept. 1922), aff'd, 235 N. Y. 605, 139 N. E. 753 (1923).
21 Compare Sioux City and Pacific R. R. v. Harry G. Stout, 17 Wall. 657
(U. S. 1874), with United Zinc and Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U. S. 268, 42 Sup.
Ct. 299 (1921).
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this right of revocation. Because of the presence of the securities in
Colorado, that state imposed an inheritance tax. Later, New York
tax authorities also sought to tax the trust, but were denied the right
to do so by the New York Court of Appeals. On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, held, four judges dissenting, reversed.
The power to revoke a trust is equivalent to ownership and, therefore,
subject to a death tax by the state wherein the deceased was domiciled.
Graves v. Elliot, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1939).
(Second Case) Decedent, domiciled in Tennessee, transferred
to an Alabama trustee certain stocks and bonds, reserving the trust
income and a general power of appointment over the corpus of the
trust which could be exercised by will. The trust was in all other
respects irrevocable. Alabama claimed the right to tax because the
intangibles were within her borders. Tennessee asserted her right to
tax on the ground that the power of disposition by will is equivalent
to ownership, and that the maxim mnobilia sequuntur personam 1 gave
the securities a taxable situs in Tennessee. The Tennessee Supreme
Court upheld Tennessee's right to tax and Alabama's taxing juris-
diction was denied. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
held, four judges dissenting, reversed so far as the decree of the
Supreme Court denies the power of Alabama to tax. The transfer is
taxable in both states. The rule that intangibles are taxed at their
situs and not elsewhere, based on the theory that it is the identity or
association of intangibles with the person of their owner at his domi-
cile which gives jurisdiction to tax, is not applicable where the tax-
payer extends his activities with respect to his intangibles, so as to
avail himself of the protection and benefit of the laws of another state.
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 350, 59 Sup. Ct. 900 (1939).
Both cases concern the determination of the taxable situs of a
trust of securities where the settlor of the trust is domiciled in one
state and the physical evidences of the corpus, in which she retains
certain powers, are in another. Both cases hinge on her relation to
the corpus and the court's interpretation of the nature of the intan-
gible. In the first case, the trust (in which the power to revoke is
reserved) was created in the settlor's state before she became a New
York resident. In the second case, the trust (in which the power to
dispose of it by will is retained) was created outside of the donor's
domicile. The principal defense in both cases was the claim that the
same property was being taxed twice in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
1 Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 22, 11 Sup. Ct. 876
(1890) ("The old rule expressed in the maxim inobilia sequuntur persmiam by
which personal property was regarded as subject to the law of the owner's
domicile, grew up in the Middle Ages when movable property consisted chiefly
of gold and jewels, which could be easily carried by the owner from place to
place, or secreted in spots known only to himself. In modern times, since the
great increase in amount and variety of personal property, not immediately
connected with the person of the owner, that rule has yielded more and more
to the lex situs, the law of the place where the property is kept and used").
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however, does not prohibit double taxation.2  Consequently, much
hardship results in that the "same property is subjected to an inheri-
tance tax in two states". 3 Prior to the principle expounded in Union
Refrigerator Transit Company v. Kentucky 4 and settled in Frick v.
Pennsylvania,5 the maxim inobilia sequuntur personam was applied to
tangible as well as intangible property. Property was being taxed by
the state wherein it was located and by the state wherein the taxable
event (death) took place. 6 With the Frick case, the maxim was lim-
ited in its application by strictly denying the state of domicile the
power to tax tangible property having an actual situs in another state.
However, nothing was said in favor of intangibles and the hardship
of double taxation in respect to them still persisted.
7
In the first of the principal cases, the New York Court of Ap-
peals 8 followed the decisions of the Supreme Court in Safe Deposit
and Trust Company v. Virginia 9 and Wachovia Bank and Trust
Company v. Doughton,10 both of which decidedly undermined the law
upholding double taxation.11  In the former case, the court gave
recognition to the principle set forth in Blodgett v. Silberman,12 that
2 Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253 U. S. 325, 330, 40 Sup.
Ct. 558 (1920) (holding that a tax imposed upon intangible property in more
than one state to be valid, Justice Brandeis said, "* * * it is sufficient to say
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit double taxation").
3 Graves v. Elliot, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1939), Hughes, C. J.,
dissenting.
4 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905).
"268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct 603 (1925).
6 "No doubt, power on the part of two states to tax on different and more
or less inconsistent principles leads to some hardship. It may be regretted, also,
that one and the same state should be seen taxing on the one hand according to
the fact of power, and on the other, at the same time, according to the fiction
that, in succession after death mobilia sequuntur personaim and domicile governs
the whole. But these inconsistencies infringe no rule of constitutional law."
Per Holmes, J., in Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903).
When a state levies taxes within its authority property not in itself taxable
could be used as a measure of the tax imposed. Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U. S.
525, 40 Sup. Ct. 2 (1919).
7 The court stated that the reasons and rules applying to taxation of intan-
gibles have no application to the taxation of intangibles; see Note (1926) 42
A. L. 1R 330.
8 In re Brown's Estate, 274 N. Y. 10, 8 N. E. 10 (1937), rev'd, 307 U. S.
357, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1919).
9 280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929) (wherein the state of a decedent's
domicile was denied the right to tax a trust of intangibles created by the
decedent who retained the power to revoke, but in actual possession of a trustee
residing in another state).
10272 U. S. 567, 47 Sup. Ct. 202 (1926). The situation in the second
principal case is hardly distinguishable from that of the Waclwvia Bank case,
except for the fact that in the former case the decedent was both donor and
donee of the power of appointment. In the latter case, the Supreme Court
denied North Carolina, the decedent's domicile, the right to tax. "We think
the assets of the trust estate had no situs, actual or constructive, in North
Carolina".
11 Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916).
12 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1927) (In this issue the decedent, a resident
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the fiction mobilia sequuntur personam may be applied to determine
the situs of intangible personal property, with the qualification that the
fiction "must yield to established fact of legal ownership, actual pres-
ence, and control elsewhere, and ought not to be applied if so to do
would result in inescapable and patent injustice whether through
double taxation or otherwise". This has often been repeated 13 and
has been applied mainly to the "business situs" cases, where credits
acquire an actual situs in a state other than the domicile of the owner
if they are used in carrying on a business.14
However, there came a series of decisions wherein the fiction was
arbitrarily applied to avoid the injustice of double taxation by the
states as it affected intangibles. These decisions gave full credence to
the legal ownership theory. The first case 15 held property in the
nature of debts to be taxable at the domicile of the creditor only, and
not by the state wherein the physical evidences of the debts had their
of Connecticut, had control and present right to all benefits arising from the
property physically within in New York. The legal title was nwt held by
another [italics ours] with the duty to return possession. The court did not
decide whether the property had a taxable situs in New York. The court said,
"It is not enough to show that the written or printed evidence of ownership
may, by the law of the state wherein they are physically present, be permitted
to be taken in execution or dealt with as reaching that of which they are
evidence even without the presence of the owner. While bonds are so often
treated, they are nevertheless in their essence only evidence of the debt".). Cf.
Virginia v. Imperial Coal Co., 293 U. S. 15, 55 Sup. Ct. 12 (1934).,
13 The Court of Appeals in It re Brown's Estate, 274 N. Y. 10, 18, 8 N. E.
(2d) 42, 44, rev'd, 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 913 (1939), said that the principle
that the situs follows the domicile, frequently arbitrarily and strictly applied,
has given way to the logical-and rational exception that where "the fact is
clear that the intangible property has a situs elsewhere, the fiction will not be
followed", citing New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. 110 (1899).
14 Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585 (1899),
citing, In re Jefferson, 35 Minn. 215, 28 N. W. 256, 259 (1886) ("For many
purposes the domicile of the owner is deemed the situs of his personal property.
This, however, is only a fiction from motives of convenience and is not of
universal application, but yields to the actual situs of the property when justice
requires that it should. It is not allowed to be controlling in questions of
taxation"); State Board of Assessors v. Comptoir National d'Escompte, 191
U. S .388, 24 Sup. Ct. 109 (1903) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. City of New
Orleans, 205 U. S. 395, 27 Sup. Ct. 499 (1907) ; Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392,
27 Sup. Ct. 712 (1908); Liverpool, London and Globe Ins. Co. v. Orleans
Assessors, 221 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 550 (1910) ; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox,
298 U. S. 193, 56 Sup. Ct. 773 (1935) (in which case the Court said that as to
intangibles no sufficient reason exists for saying that they are not entitled to
enjoy an immunity against taxation at more than one place similar to that
accorded to tangibles).
25 Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota; 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct.
98 (1930) (Bonds were issued to a New York resident by the State of
Minnesota and kept in New York vaults. Held, to be taxable by New
York only. "While debts have no actual territorial situs we have ruled that a
state may properly apply the rule inobilia sequuntur personam and treat them
as localized at the creditor's domicile.") ; cf. S. B. Laurence v. State Tax
Commission of Mississippi, 286 U. S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct. 556 (1931). Contra:
Wheeler v. Sohmer, 232 U. S. 434, 34 Sup. Ct. 607 (1914).
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situs. This was followed in Baldwin v. Missouri,'8 wherein the
deceased, an Illinois resident, left credits secured by notes and liens in
Missouri and bank deposits in Missouri banks. The court denied the
power of Missouri to tax, declaring that Illinois was the only taxable
situs of the credits. The trend was maintained in a South Carolina
case, 17 wherein the court held the indebtedness of.a corporation to be
subject to an inheritance tax at the deceased creditor's domicile and
not by the state of incorporation. Finally, the law was settled as to
the transfer tax on corporate stock.' 8 It was held that the imposition
of a tax by the state of domicile of a corporation, in respect to shares
of stock in the corporation forming part of the estate of non-resident
decedent, was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In effect,
corporate stock was categorized with bonds, notes, and credits when
such intangibles are subjected to an inheritance tax in the domicile of
the owner where the taxable event occurs. The court ' 9 unambig-
uously said: "Shares of stock like other intangibles constitutionally
can be subjected to death transfer taxes by one state only." 20
Because of the holdings in the instant cases, the effect of those
decisions which defeated double taxation has been considerably weak-
ened. Consequently, the Wachovia 21 and the Safe Deposit and Trust
Company 22 cases are in a questionable light, and it appears as if the
Bullen v. Wisconsin 23 case is once more acceptable law. -
To meet the burdensome situation of multiple taxation which
these two decisions revitalized, New York 24 and many other states 25
have enacted reciprocal exemption statutes. It view of the conflict of
the courts' decisions, it is evident that legislation is the only panacea.28
B. S.
16281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1929).
17 Beidler v. South Carolina, 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54 (1930).
28 First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174
(1931).
19 Id. at 328.
20 Worcester County Co. v. Reilly, 302 U. S. 292, 59 Sup. Ct. 911 (1937).
21240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473 (1916).
22280 U. S. 83, 50 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929).
23 N. Y. CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 3. "Moneys, credits, securities and other
intangible personal property within the state not employed in carrying on any
business therein by the owners shall be deemed to be located at the domicile of
the owner for the purpose of taxation, and if held in trust, shall not be deemed
to be located in this state- for purposes of taxation because of the trustee being
domiciled in this state. * * *"
24 Orr, Reciprocal Exemptions from Inheritance Taxation (1938) 18 B. U.
L. REv. 41, n.25.
25 Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281
U. S. 586, 596, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (1929) said: "Very probably it might be a good
policy to restrict taxation to a single place, and perhaps the technical conception
of domicile may be the best determinant. But it seems to me if that result is
reached, it should be reached through understanding among. the states, by uni-
form legislation or otherwise".
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